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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
APPEALS
BY WILLIAmI

H.

ERICKSON

Member of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson & Meyer
This article contains a compilation of the decisions and opinions
of the Supreme Court of Colorado that were handed down from
January 1, 1959, to January 1, 1960, interpreting and construing the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. This review will endeavor to
show the court's interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
the numerical order of the rules. Only those cases involving procedure and appeals which, in the author's opinion, set forth, alter,
or clarify the court's interpretation of the rules will be included in
this article.
RULE 4

In Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc.,' the defendant sought to
attack the service of process under rule 4, claiming that she was
identified in the summons without her middle initial and that the
return of service contained an erroneous address. The court refused
to set aside the service of process for a mere technical error, defect,
or omission in either the summons or the return where the error,
defect, or omission affects no, substantial rights of the defendant.
The court pointed out that the middle initial constitutes no part of
one's name. The erroneous return did not detract from the validity
of the service, in the court's opinion, and the failure to include the
defendant's middle initial in the summons meant nothing, since the
law recognizes but one Christian name.
RULE 5
In Zerobnick v. City and County of Denver,2 the Supreme Court
refused to allow Denver to reinstate a suspended jail sentence in
the superior court that had been imposed for the violation of municipal ordinances, because rules 5 and 7 (b) were not complied with,
and said:
Generally, 'the practice and procedure of superior
courts shall be in accordance with the Colorado rules of
civil procedure.' C.R.S. '53, 1957 Cum. Supp. 37-11-3. Treating the case as a civil proceeding, the Superior Court was
obliged to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. Did it do so?
The motion to reinstate the jail sentence was a motion
within Rules 5 and 7(b), R.C.P.Colo. By the terms of
Rule 5, a party whose appearance is of record should be
served personally or through his counsel. In this case, the
withdrawal of counsel for Zerobnick in no way affected his
appearance in the case, and it was incumbent on the city to
serve him personally with a copy of the motion or a 'written notice of the hearing of the motion, or * * * a written

notice of application
to set the same for hearing.' Rule 7
3
(b) (1), R.C.P.Colo.

1 348 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1959).
2 337 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1959).
3 Id. at 12-13.
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The court found that Denver had not complied with either the
requirements of a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding and reversed the action of the superior court in reinstating the sentence.
The court concerned itself in Thompson v. McCormick4 with an
attempt to serve plaintiff's counsel after they were discharged. The
court held that plaintiff's former attorneys could not bind him or
act as his agents for service, and that service on them was ineffectual for any purpose. The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint for a partnership accounting, receivership and $20,000
damages, after the plaintiff failed to appear pursuant to a trial setting. No notice of the trial setting ever reached the plaintiff, despite
the efforts of his former attorneys. The court found that the defendant had not complied with the default provisions of rule 55 or
the involuntary dismissal provisions of rule 41, and ruled that there
was no notice or service thereof on the plaintiff, as required by rule
5. The court accordingly reversed the case with direction for the
trial court to sustain the plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment
of dismissal, and to proceed to trial on the merits. The court said:
The judgment of dismissal having been entered without notice is void and is subject to direct or collateral attack. Laches does not preclude attack upon a void judgment. The court was in error in entering judgment; also in
error in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment.5
In Pearson v. Pearson,6 however, the court upheld service on a
plaintiff's attorney in a divorce action involving plaintiff's custodial
rights over her children. The service under rule 5 (b) (1) was held
good on the ground that the order determining custody in the interlocutory decree of divorce was not final, and was a matter still
pending before the court. In this case, the plaintiff's counsel had
been discharged and was unable to locate his client to provide
notice of the proceeding to modify the custody award. The trial
court, when the mother failed to appear, entered an order changing
the custody of the children without any evidence that such a change
would serve the best interest of the children. The Supreme Court
reversed the custodial findings of the trial court, but affirmed the
service on the discharged attorneys by stating that one could not
4 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
5 Id. at "1.42, 335 P.2d at 269-70. But see Davis v. Kaes, 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959); White,
Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp., 347 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
6 347 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1959).
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avoid jurisdiction by discharging his attorney and moving out of
the state.
Also in apparent contrast to Thompson v. McCormick,7 the
court, in White, Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil &
Uranium Corp.," and in Davis v. Klaes,9 upheld judgments that were
taken in the trial court when the defendant failed to appear for
trial after counsel had withdrawn. Both cases can be distinguished
from Thompson v. McCormick on the facts and on the basis that
actual notice had been received by the defendants. In White, Green
& Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp. the defendant sought relief under rule 60, and the case is, therefore, set out
under that rule. Davis v. Klaes raised an issue under rule 55 (b)
and is reviewed under rule 55.
RULE 9

The court, in O.K. Uranium Development Co. v. Miller,10 gave
a liberal interpretation to rule 9. The defendants urged as grounds
for dismissal that a complaint seeking rescission for fraud did not
allege fraud with the particularity required by rule 9. The defendants had filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, but the motion
had not been ruled upon, and the defendants answered over the
motion. Trial was had on the issues made by the complaint and the
answer without the sufficiency of the complaint being challenged.
The court found that the evidence was ample to sustain the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of fraud and granted the
requested rescission. By way of dictum the court suggested that if
the matter of pleading had been raised in the trial court, an
amendment to conform to the evidence would have been in order
under rule 15 (b).
RULE 12
The court dealt with the interpretation of the zoning ordinances
of the City of Westminster and the injunctive power of the district
court in Erickson v. Groomer." The Board of Adjustment had
granted a variance to Erickson to construct an apartment house in
a class "A" residential district. Erickson obtained a building permit
and commenced excavation in accordance with the ruling of the
Board of Adjustment. Groomer, prior to the expiration of the twenty days following service on Erickson, caused his application for a
preliminary injunction to be heard, and the trial court ruled that
the variances and building permits were void, restrained further
building, and directed that the part constructed by Erickson be torn
down. Erickson prayed for relief from the order and pointed out
that a newly enacted zoning ordinance authorized his intended use.
The Supreme Court held that the action taken against Erickson was
defective for two reasons: (1) The trial court was without lawful
authority at the time it entered its final judgment providing for a
permanent injunction, and the judgment was void because it was
taken in violation of rule 12 (a) and before the twenty days set
forth in the summons expired for Erickson to appear and defend.
7 138
9 347
9 346
10 345
11 336

Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).
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(2) The ordinance passed by Westminster rendered the question
before the court moot.
In Koch v. Whitten,12 the court reaffirmed its position on the
granting of a judgment on the pleadings under rule 12 (f). In order
to grant judgment on the pleadings, the court held that the moving
party must show that he is entitled to a judgment under the admitted facts without regard to what the findings might be on the
facts with respect to which issue is joined. The court said that where
a material issue of fact was present which could only be determined
by the taking of testimony, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is improper. An issue of fact was found in the case by the court,
and the judgment on the pleadings was, therefore, reversed. The
Koch case also clarified rule 12 (f) on motions to strike, with the
following statement:
A mass of evidence unnecessarily pleaded, legal conclusions argued at length, paragraphs seeking to retry a
previous action, all obviously sham matter, may be stricken. Motions to strike alleged redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters are not favored. If there
is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied. Even
if the allegations are redundant or immaterial, they could
not be stricken if their presence
in the pleading cannot
13
prejudice the adverse party.
RULE 16
In a case arising out of an auto-pedestrian accident the Supreme Court reversed a judgment favorable to the defendant. 14 An
elderly woman was struck while walking across a highway, and the
issue arose as to whether she was within a crosswalk. The instructions were that there was no crosswalk. The complaint alleged that
she was within a crosswalk, and the Supreme Court held that the
admission by the defendant at the pre-trial conference that the acts
occurred at the time and place alleged in the complaint was tantamount to a stipulation of fact which dispensed with the necessity of
proof. The trial court, therefore, was held to have committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a fact situation that was
inconsistent with the stipulation at the pre-trial conference, and the
action was reversed.
RULE 24
In Hercules Equipment Co. v. Smith, 5 the court reversed the
action of the trial court in allowing a stranger to the action to intervene and obtain a temporary and permanent restraining order
against the Sheriff of the City and County of Denver. The facts
were these: the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant
and caused an execution to be issued against an automobile. The
defendant's wife filed a motion for a restraining order, claiming
ownership of the automobile and attaching a copy of her title to the
car. The trial judge granted the restraining order, restrained the
12
13
14
15

342 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1959).
Id. at 1015, quoting 2 Moore, Federal Practice % 12.21 (1)-(2) at 2314-18 (2d ed. 1948).
Allison v. Trustee, 344 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959).
138 Colo. 458, 335 P.2d 255 (1959).
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sheriff from proceeding further in execution on the automobile and
from retaining possession of the car. The plaintiff urged on writ of
error that the wife's title was obtained in fraud of creditors and
therefore was void. The record failed to support the plaintiff's
position, and the court struck the fraud claim for failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the affirmative pleading provisions of rule
8(c). However, the record disclosed that the wife had filed her
motion without leave of court and had not obtained permission to
intervene in accordance with rule 24(a) (3), and that she was a
complete stranger to the case. The court found that the wife had
an adequate remedy at law by way of replevin and that an injunction should not have been granted. The record disclosed that the
sheriff had not received notice of the proceedings in which the injunction was obtained, and the court accordingly reversed the action and directed that the motion for restraining order be stricken
and that all parties be permitted to take such steps as they deemed
advisable in the trial court.16
RULE 26
The widely publicized decision in Lucas v. District Court,17
came about when the plaintiff took a deposition in an automobile
accident case and the defendants refused to disclose the amount of
the policy limits of the liability insurance policies owned by them,
although they admitted in the course of the deposition that such insurance policies existed. The plaintiff moved for an order requiring the defendants to disclose the policy limits of their liability insurance, and the motion was denied by the district court. In an
original proceeding, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus
commanding the district court to expunge from the record the order
denying the plaintiff the right to discover the insurance limits and
requiring the defendants to supply the requested information.
The principal issue in the Lucas case, in the court's opinion, was
whether discovery of the insurance policy limits was relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action. The court held that
the term "relevant" is not limited to matter which is admissible in
evidence at the trial, but "includes all of those things which are
relevant to the subject matter of the action." The court said, "In
our view, the term 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action' includes inquiries as to the existence of liability
insurance and the policy limits of such insurance."'
The problem dealt with by the court in the Lucas case has been
the subject of many decisions and articles. 19 The court reviewed
the many decisions upholding discovery of the type before the court
and those denying such discovery, and said, "The thread which runs
through all of these decisions in that the term 're!evant' is not lim16 See Groendyke Transport Co. v. District Court, 343 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1959); Howard v. International Trust Co., 338 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
17 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959), 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 387.
18 Id. at 1068.
19 See, e.g., accord, Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tenn. 1951); Orgel
v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d
605 (1937); People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 III. 2d 231, 135 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Maddox v. Graumon,
265 S.W. 2d 939(Ky. 1954); Frank, Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 Ins. L.J. 281; Levit, Discovery
of Liability Limits Before Trial, 1959 Ins. L.J. 246; Roberts, A Reappraisal of Discovery Procedure Per.
mitting Disclosure of Liability Insurance Limits, 6 Defense I.J. 238; Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits
in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases, 10 Ala. L. Rev. 355 (1958); Wright, Recent Trends in the
Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L.J. 409 (1955). Contra, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68
N.W.2d 649 (1955); Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1955).
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ited to matter which is admissible in evidence at the trial or which
will properly lead to admissible evidence, but includes all of those
'20
things which are relevant to the subject matter of the action.
The court stated that the term "relevant" must be given a liberal interpretation and that the rules contemplate that a deponent
shall answer all questions, except those to which he objects on the
ground of privilege, and that objections based on admissibility are
to be saved until the actual trial.
In concurring with the result, Mr. Justice Frantz emphasized
the wording of the rule and particularly the portion relating to the
claim or defense of any other party. Mr. Justice Sutton vigorously
dissented, and Mr. Justice Moore, on rehearing, questioned not only
the procedure, but the result.
The procedural problem involved in the Lucas case will be approached in the review of rule 106, since the court declared rule
106 to be inapplicable to original proceedings in the Supreme Court.
The Lucas case caused insurance counsel representing companies which issued more than fifty per cent of the liability insurance written in Colorado to rise to the defense and seek relief in the
Supreme Court by way of a petition for rehearing. On rehearing,
the insurance counsel who appeared as amici curiae, claimed that
the pronouncement of the court violated a number of constitutional
provisions, and the court summarized their claims as follows:
• * * violation of due process, state and federal; equal
protection of laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution; privileges and
immunities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
of Article V, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution; searches
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and Sec. 7, Article II of the Colorado
Constitution. They (amici curiae) finally argue that the
ruling constitutes 2invasion
by the judiciary of the province
1
of the Legislature.
The court adhered to its former ruling with minor procedural
and factual corrections, and the right of a plaintiff to know what
insurance coverage the defendant has is now established in Colorado.
The court said as a conclusion to its original opinion:
As a result of our study of the rules, the statute and the
decisions of other jurisdictions, it is our opinion that the
holding which allows questions to be propounded in pretrial depositions for the purpose of eliciting information as
to the existence of liability insurance and the policy limits
of such liability insurance is the better rule, and the one
which is more in accord with the object, purpose and
philosophy of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This object and
purpose is served by holding that the scope of examination
is broad. This will have a tendency to eliminate secrets,
mysteries and surprises and should promote disposition of
cases without trial and
22 substantially just results in those
cases which are tried.
20 345 P.2d at 1070.
21 Id. at 1074.
22 Id. at 1070.
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The Rules of Civil Procedure admittedly induce pre-trial settlements, and the Lucas case, in the author's opinion, will eliminate
many of the last minute settlements that are made on the court
house steps. The opinion of the court will enable the parties to
evaluate a claim at arm's length and not within the hidden recesses
of unknown insurance coverage. Lucas is a landmark decision that
grants unto all litigants the wide latitude of discovery which the
draftsmen of the rules intended, and which is eminently fair and in
complete accord with rule 26 (b) .23
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. District Court24 is in sharp contrast to
the Lucas opinion. The railroad patterned an original proceeding in
mandamus after the Lucas case, and the Supreme Court denied the
application and indicated that the petition was not sanctioned by
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts upon which the controversy
centered were that interrogatories were propounded pursuant to
rule 33 and within the scope of rule 26 (b), and the plaintiff refused
to answer the interrogatories. The railroad, the defendant in the
trial court, moved to compel answers to the interrogatories, and the
trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court found that the
answers were relevant in part, but held that the correctness of the
trial judge's action on the interrogatories could be adequately reviewed by writ of error. A party, in the court's opinion, who appears on writ of error and who has refused to make discovery, does
so at his peril, and such conduct may well be the basis for reversal
of a favorable judgment that was obtained by the party who refused to make discovery. The court distinguished its pronouncement from the Lucas decision by saying that the information sought
in that case could not be had by any other procedure. The court
also indicated that the rules did not provide for the filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus for the relief requested and that the
petition could have been stricken rather than denied.
RULE 34
In Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co.,25 the suicide clause
of a life insurance policy was urged as a defense to a claim made
by the insured's beneficiary. Rule 34 was the pivotal issue in the
case. The defendant insurance company obtained an order from
the trial court requiring the plaintiff to produce a copy of the investigation report made by the United States Army for the purpose of determining the cause of death. The plaintiff claimed that
the document was not in her possession or control and that the
court could not order the plaintiff to take steps to make the report
available to the defendant. The Supreme Court held that under
rule 34, the plaintiff must produce, subject to the limitations of rule
26(b), all documents which are obtainable by the order or direction of the litigant, and said that actual possession of the documents
or things is not necessary if the litigant has control of them.
23 See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 646 (1950).
24 347 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1959).
25 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959).
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RULE 38

A petition in contributory dependency brought McBain v. Lopez 26 before the court by writ of error. A referee of the juvenile
court took evidence and found paternity existed and ordered that
support be paid, but granted Lopez ten days to appeal the findings
and recommendations to the judge of the juvenile court. Lopez
filed a motion for a new trial and request for a jury in compliance
with the referee's ruling, but did not serve McBain or her counsel
with a copy of the motion. Nearly a year later, but before the motion was disposed of, McBain caused Lopez to be cited for contempt
for failure to pay the support that was ordered by the referee and
claimed that the failure of Lopez to properly serve the motion nullified the appeal. Lopez moved to dismiss the citation, and the court
honored his motion and granted him a jury trial. At the subsequent
trial, the issue of paternity was resolved by a jury in Lopez's favor.
On appeal the Supreme Court recognized the failure to serve McBain with a motion but held that Lopez had complied with the
referee's order. In examining the incomplete record and affirming
the lower court, the court said that in the absence of a record showing otherwise, it must be assumed that a full-scale hearing was had
and all issues submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
RULE 50

In Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. v. Ford,27 the court upheld
the trial court in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The plaintiff claimed damages for money had and received by the
defendant for allegedly issuing false weight certificates in excess
of the actual grain delivered to the plaintiff. At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, and the
court reserved its ruling. The jury brought in a verdict against the
defendant, and a motion for a new trial was filed, alleging as one
ground therefor that the trial court had erred in failing to grant the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court overruled the
motion for a new trial, but vacated the judgment, thus in effect
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, the defendant urged that the plaintiff's motion was
not in compliance with rule 50(b), but the Supreme Court upheld
the trial court, stating that it would be manifestly unjust to give the
technical interpretation to rule 50 (b) that the defendant urged. The
motion filed by the defendant, in the court's opinion, was sufficient
to authorize the trial 28court to enter judgment in his favor, notwithstanding the verdict.
In Barth v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,29 the plaintiff sought to recover
from the defendant on a chattel mortgage on a truck. The defendant asserted two counterclaims, one for the wrongful taking of the
truck, and one for wrongful attachment that was levied upon his
bank account by the plaintiff. Service of the writ of attachment and
notice of levy was not effected upon the defendant. At the close of
the defendant's opening statement, the trial court honored the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for conversion
26 138
27 343
28 See
29 342

Colo. 482, 334 P.2d 1097 (1959).
P.2d 828 (Colo. 1959).
also Crouch v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 343 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 637 (Col.. 1959).
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of the truck. At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff moved to
dismiss the counterclaim for wrongful attachment, and that motion
was granted, and a verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff for
the amount prayed for in the complaint. The Supreme Court held
that there were factual issues that were clearly open for determination by the jury and that the errors of the trial court required reversal.
Schweizer v. Amalgamated Butcher Workmen" upheld the
trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant. In the
case before the court, the plaintiff claimed that she had been hired
by the defendant and was unjustly discharged and sought damages
under her employment contract. The court found that a review of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff did not present a question upon which the minds of reasonable men might
differ; and since the plaintiff failed to establish the allegations of
her complaint, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling directing
a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.
In prosecuting her writ of error, the plaintiff attempted to introduce matters not included in her complaint, and the court refused
to consider her new claim when it was raised for the first time on
writ of error and was not before the trial court.
RULE 52
In Mowry v. Jackson,31 a suit involving the right of a veteran
to purchase a parcel of land under the Veterans Act from the Land
Board, the trial court was found to be in error for failure to comply
with the clear mandate of rule 52(a). The trial court had found
against the plaintiff and made no definite findings of fact, stating
that they were in the record. The court, in emphasizing the wording of rule 52 (a), said:
It is the Rule itself which leaves the matter in the
sound discretion of the trial court as to whether the findings shall be written or oral, but that discretion does not
mean that no findings of fact need be made. The court has
a duty to make one or the other and if made orally to see
that his statement thereon is transcribed in full. In either
event, such findings must be so explicit as to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial
court's decision and to enable 3it2 to determine the ground
on which it reached its decision.
The court pointed out that it is not necessary to request findings
of fact for the purpose of review. On the basis of the court's decisions, it is anticipated that in the future where necessary findings
of fact are lacking and review is sought, our court will not dismiss
the writ, but will vacate the judgment and remand the case to the
trial court for appropriate findings of fact; and if this procedure
cannot be followed,
the judgment will be reversed and remanded
33

for a new trial.
In its pronouncement, the court supplants its ruling in Mass34

achusetts Bonding & Investment Co. v. Central Finance Corp.,
30 347 P.2d 516 (Colo. 1959).
31 343 P.2d 833 (Colo. 1959).
32 Id. at 836.
33 See Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955).
34 124 Cola. 379, 237 P.2d 1079 (1951).
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where the court approved the action of the trial court in merely
making an oral finding to the effect that the issues joined were in
favor of the plaintiff.
RULE 53
In Hutchinson v. Elder,35 the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court for setting aside the findings and conclusions of the master.
The issues framed by the pleadings on the interpretation of a contract were referred to a master for hearing. The trial court, after
the master conducted a full hearing and made his report, found the
contract to be unambiguous and set aside the findings and conclusions of the master. The court held that the trial court committed
error in rejecting the master's report and said:
Rule 53 (3) (2) R.C.P. Colo. provides:
'In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall
accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly errone-

ous.

* * *'

That the rule binds the district court to accept the findings of a master just as effectively as rule 52 (a) binds this
court to accept findings of a trial court is not a new principle and has long been recognized.... 3
RULE

55

Davis v. Klaes37 upheld the action of the trial court in taking

a judgment over the defendant's objection that the three-day notice
requirement set forth in rule 55 (b) (2) had not been complied
with. The judgment was entered when the defendant failed to appear for trial at the time set by the court. He had made a general
appearance, filed an answer, had personal knowledge of the day set
for trial, and had contacted the court on the date that the case was
set for trial. His counsel had withdrawn from the case a month before the trial. When he failed to appear for trial, evidence was taken and the trial proceeded to the conclusion of the plaintiff's case,
at which time judgment was entered. After the judgment was entered, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment on the ground
of inadvertence and excusable neglect. The court found that the
defendant had notice and that the judgment taken was not a default
judgment within the scope of rule 55 requiring a three-day notice.
An examination of the case will disclose that the action taken by
the trial court was not in fact a proceeding in which a default judgment was entered, but was a trial on the merits after issues were
formulated and a trial date set with due notice to the defendant.3 8
RULE 56
Rogerson v. Rudd 39 again voiced the Supreme Court's unwillingness to grant a summary judgment when there is any unresolved
issue of a material fact. Rudd sought to rescind a contract for the
sale of cattle. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant
moved to dismiss, and the trial court sustained the defendant's mo35 344 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
36 Id. at 1092.
37 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
38 Accord, White, Green & Addison Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp., 347 P.2d 135 (Colo.
1959). But see Thompson v. McCormick, 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
39 345 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1959).
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tion and granted judgment on the defendant's counterclaim.
The
40
Supreme Court reversed and remanded that action.
The trial court, when it reviewed the matter pursuant to the
Supreme Court's remand, honored the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment on the basis of the record and the opinion of the
Supreme Court, dismissed the defendant's counterclaim and took
testimony only on the question of the plaintiff's damage. In finding that there still remained genuine unresolved issues of material
facts which had not been tried, the Supreme Court ruled that the
defendant had been foreclosed in the first trial from presenting evidence in opposition to the plaintiff's claim because of the trial
court's action in granting his motion at the end of the plaintiff's
case and had been denied the privilege of introducing evidence in
the second trial by reason of the court's ruling on the motion for
summary judgment. The defendant had been denied his day in
court, and that, in the court's opinion, was ground for reversal.
In Farrell v. Bashor,41 one of the few cases in which a summary
judgment has withstood appeal, the Supreme Court allowed a summary judgment against the plaintiff to stand on a complaint alleging damages for the overflow of a reservoir. The Supreme Court's
action was predicated more upon the failure of the plaintiff to perfect his appeal in accordance with rules 111, 112 and 115, than it was
upon the defendant's right to a summary judgment under rule 56.
RULE 59
In Howard v. InternationalTrust Co.,42 a motion for a new trial

was filed on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The action
sought an order compelling reconveyance of property conveyed to
Howard by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who had died after the commencement of the trial, was represented by the trust company. In
affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff,
the court found that the newly discovered evidence that was asserted by the defendant as grounds for a new trial was merely cumulative and found that the trial court was within its discretion in not
granting a new trial.
The court held in Bushner v. Bushner43 that after a judgment
of a trial court is reversed by the Supreme Court with directions for
the trial court to enter a specific judgment, a motion may be filed
for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence by the
party that was successful in the trial court and that the motion
must be considered on its merits. The court said, "Reason and justice require that after a reversal by the Supreme Court, the party
originally successful in the trial court (and only he) can file a motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence,
'44
and only on that ground.

The trial court had stricken the motion for a new trial as not
being in compliance with the rules. The evidence presented by the
defendant was not, as viewed by the Supreme Court, newly discovered evidence, and the trial court was held to be in error for striking the motion for not being in compliance with the rules. The
40 Rudd v. Rogerson, 133 Colo. 506, 297 P.2d 533 (1956).
41 344 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1959).
42 338 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
43 348 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1959).
44 Id. at 154.
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court held that the proper procedure would have been for the trial
court to consider the motion for a new trial and overrule it.
In Devlin v. Huffman,45 a habeas corpus proceeding involving
the custody of children, it was urged that the trial court committed
error in dispensing with a motion for a new trial because the court's
action precluded the plaintiffs from presenting newly discovered
evidence which would show perjury on the part of the defendants.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's ruling dispensing
with a motion for a new trial, repeated the oft quoted law that the
welfare and best interest of the children serve as the paramount
consideration in a custody proceeding. The court refused to consider the newly discovered evidence which was included in affidavit
form in the plaintiff's brief in the Supreme Court and which was
not before the trial court and therefore not properly a part of the
record before the Supreme Court.
RULE 60
In holding again that applications to vacate default judgments
are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that the
Supreme Court will only interfere when that discretion has been
Green & Addison
abused, the court affirmed the judgment in White,
46
Associates v. Monarch Oil & Uranium Corp.
In this case the plaintiffs prayed for possession of certain mining claims that they had leased to the defendant, alleging that the
defendant had not complied with the terms of the leases. A hearing was held with the parties and their counsel present, and at that
time the case was set for trial. On the trial date the court permitted
counsel for the defendants to withdraw his appearance, and then
proceeded to trial. The evidence offered was heard and judgment
was entered in accordance with the complaint. Nearly a month
later the defendant, appearing by new counsel, moved to vacate the
judgment, alleging surprise, a meritorious defense, irregularities in
the proceedings, and that the ends of justice demanded that the
judgment be vacated. The defendant also claimed that it was denied a fair trial by the court's action in allowing defendant's counsel
to withdraw without granting a continuance to the defendant to secure other counsel. The record disclosed that defense counsel and
the court had notified the defendant of the firmness of the trial
date. Witnesses had been brought from a distance by the plaintiff.
45 339 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1959).
46 347 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1959).
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In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court
again reiterated that parties cannot be permitted to disregard the
process of the court, and then, after judgment, come in at their
convenience upon the mere allegation 47of the existence of a meritorious defense and vacate the judgment.
In Lohr v. Wills,4 s the plaintiff sued to cancel a water lease that

was executed with a deed of trust as security for a loan. The defendant asserted counterclaims against the plaintiff, and defenses
of laches and the statute of limitations. It was admitted that the
loans which were made at the time the lease and deed of trust were
executed had been paid. The case was determined on the basis of
the motions for summary judgment made by both the plaintiff and
the defendant and supporting exhibits and stipulations of the parties. The trial court ruled that the water lease was terminated
upon the payment of the loan. The defendant promptly filed a designation of record for appellate purposes. Immediately thereafter
the plaintiff filed a motion under rule 60 to correct the judgment
and findings of fact on the ground that the judgment should have
been entered on the motions for summary judgment and the evidence embodied in the stipulation of the parties and the exhibits,
and not in a form which would indicate that the issues were submitted and the case tried on the merits. The trial court entered corrected findings of fact and conclusions of law, again reviewed the
facts as stipulated, and entered its corrected findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The defendant contended that the motion made by the plaintiff
was a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59 and
should have been made within ten days after the entry of judgment,
and not being timely made, should have been denied. The plaintiff
contended that his motion was made under rule 60(a) for correction of a clerical mistake and under rule 60(b) for correction of a
mistake or for inadvertence and that the rule granted him six
months to make such a motion. In affirming the position taken by
the plaintiff, the court found that if the mistake was a clerical error, the motion was filed before the case was docketed on error and
was done within the required time; and that if it was a judicial mistake or inadvertence that the correction was made long before the
six months expired. The court cited numerous authorities supporting the action taken by the trial court and classifying the correction
as a clerical mistake.
A cognovit note came before the court in Kean v. Brown 4 9 in
an effort by the defendant to vacate a judgment and to enjoin enforcement of the judgment. Judgment had been entered pursuant
to the provisions of the note. The defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which motion was admittedly inadequate. He
filed a second motion to vacate, and tendered his answer and a thirdparty complaint with the motion. The plaintiff moved to strike the
second motion, and it was stricken by the court. The defendant
urged that the plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud on the trial court
in not setting out the defenses which the defendant asserted. On
writ of error, the court held that the question for the trial court to
47 Accord, Davis v. Kaes, 346 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1959).
48 347 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1959).
49 346 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1959).
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determine was whether a meritorious defense was tendered in the
answer which was filed with the defendant's second motion to vacate. The court said that an attorney had no obligation to inform
the court as to the possible defenses that were available or were
claimed by the defendant, and that the court's finding that there
was no fraud perpetrated upon it by the plaintiff in obtaining the
judgment complained of was entitled to substantial weight. The
court, however, reversed the trial court, with directions for the trial
court to determine whether a meritorious defense was tendered in
the answer presented to the court with the second motion to vacate.
RULE

65

In Renner v. Williams,5° the court reaffirmed its earlier jurisdictional pronouncement in Erickson v. Groomer5' and reversed the
trial court's decision for not complying with rule 65. The plaintiffs
were officers and directors of a corporation that owned a tavern
that was managed by the defendant. Pursuant to corporate resolution, the tavern was closed and the defendant manager and his wife
were discharged. The defendant obtained an ex parte temporary
restraining order granting him possession of the tavern and prohibiting the plaintiffs from interfering with him in his operation
and management of the tavern. The plantiffs refused to comply
with the court order and were cited for contempt. At the hearing
on the citation, the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the restraining
order on the ground that it was not issued in compliance with rule
65 and was, therefore, void. At the hearing on the citation, the trial
court made the temporary injunction permanent. In declaring the
temporary restraining order to be void, the Supreme Court held
that rule 65 had not been complied with, and said:
Having been issued without notice, it did not define
the injury to the applicant or state why it was of such nature as to be irreparable; the reason for issuance without
notice; the time or date of its expiration or the date of hearing for a preliminary injunction. More significant was the
failure of the court to set or require any security to be
given by the applicant. Any one of the deficiencies noted
was sufficient to render the order a nullity. This court had
occasion to consider directly the effect of failure to require the giving of security to protect the person enjoined
in Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P. 2d 1006. We
follow the holding in the Stull case that a restraining order issued without compliance with the requirement for
giving5 2security is without validity and of no force and
effect.

The invalidity of the restraining order was also held to be a
valid defense to the contempt proceeding against the plaintiffs. The
court held that the trial court issued its permanent injunction prior
to the time fixed in the summons for the plaintiffs to appear and
only had before it at the time of the hearing on the contempt citation the
issue of whether or not the plaintiffs were in contempt of
53
court.

50 344 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1959).
51 336 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).
52 344 P,2d at 967.

53 Accord, Erickson v. Groomer, 336 P.2d 296 (Colo. 1959).
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The plaintiff brought an original proceeding in prohibition in
Dyonisio v. McWilliams, 54 to stop proceedings in the district court
that had been commenced against him by the Transit Equipment
Company (a foreign corporation), the Denver National Bank, and
others. The Transit Equipment Company sought to impose a constructive trust and an equitable lien on funds in the hands of the
Denver National Bank, and on funds to be received in the future.
In support of its prayer it obtained a temporary restraining order
impounding the funds in the possession of the bank. Dyonisio was
served by publication and a temporary injunction then issued. The
Denver National Bank disclaimed any interest in the funds and
agreed to abide by any lawful order of the court. The facts were
that Dyonisio and the Transit Equipment Company had contracted
to supply seventy-five used trollies to Sao Paulo, Brazil. Transit
advanced moneys to Dyonisio, only to find that Dyonisio and his
associate made the sale excluding the Transit Equipment Company.
The court, in approving the action of the trial court, stated that
there was a res within the State of Colorado upon which jurisdicion could attach. The court approved the service of summons by
55
publication, approving its former holding in Hoff v. Armbruster,
since the action was in rem and not in personam, and said, "Essentially, the object of the action was to reach and dispose of the individual interest of each nonresident defendant in specific property
located in Colorado, by enforcing what was alleged to be a valid
-56
contract respecting that identical property ....
The plaintiff in Ambrosio v. Baker Metropolitan Water & Sanitation Dist.5 7 brought suit to enjoin the construction of a sewage
disposal plant. The court found that a condemnation suit had been
instituted by the district, an order for immediate possession had
been entered, the land had been acquired and paid for and the sewage plant erected and placed in full operation, rendering the issues
before the court moot. By way of dictum, the court announced
that an injunction will not lie to prevent suits in eminent domain,
because the respondent in an eminent domain action has an adequate remedy at law for damages for the property taken. The writ
of error was, therefore, dismissed.
RULE 81

Rule 81 (b) has been abrogated by the new statutes on divorce
and separate maintenance, which provide that "The process, practice and proceedings shall be in accordance with the rules of civil
procedure except as expressly modified or otherwise provided in
this article. ''58 And that "The process, practice and proceedings
shall be in accordance with the rules of civil procedure." 59
Rule 81(c) came before the court on four occasions. Andrews
60
v. Lull

and McKelvey v. District Court 1 both involved original

proceedings in the Supreme Court in the nature of prohibition, and
54 338 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1959).
55 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1959).
56 338 P.2d at 687-88, quoting from

Hoff v. Armbruster, supro note 55. See

Ace Flying Service, 338 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1959).
57 340 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1959).
58 Colo. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. 1958, ch. 37, § 3, at 222 (divorce).

59 Colo. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. 1958, ch. 38, § 1, at 225 (separate maintenance).

60 341 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1959).
61 345 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1959).
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both cases held that an appeal from the county to the district court
had been waived for failure to
perfect an appeal within the ten-day
62
period allowed by the statute.
In Andrews v. Lull, the Supreme Court held that the ten-day
period was not extended by the filing of a motion for a new trial
and said, "If [appellant] desires to appeal to the district court for a
trial de novo and wishes also to file a motion for a new trial, he
must either have his motion acted upon within the statutory ten-day
period or secure an extension of time to lodge his appeal ....
64
In Erbaugh v. Jacobson,
the court answered the argument that
a motion for a new trial under rule 59 (f) was a condition precedent
to the right to appeal to the district court from judgments of the
county court, by holding that the only requisites for trial de novo in
the district court are that there be a final judgment in the county
court and an appeal lodged in the district court within the time and
requirements of the applicable statutes.
The court refused to countenance an appeal in Vigil v. Vigil,65
of a divorce action that was tried in the county court by the mere
filing of a pleading entitled "Amended Complaint in Divorce Appeal," in the district court.
97
The Supreme Court reviewed Geer v. Hall66 by writ of error.
It was a certiorari proceeding in the district court that stemmed
from a hearing before the Manager of Safety of the City of Denver
on an application for a three-way liquor license. In reversing the
judgment of the district court granting a three-way liquor license
on the basis of the printed record, the court found that the motion
and affidavit for disqualification of the trial judge under rule 97
for prejudice should have been granted.
RULE

RULE 102
Aero Spray, Inc. sued Ace Flying Service for goods sold and
delivered. Both of the parties were foreign corporations. Aero

Spray, Inc. v. Ace Flying Service, Inc.6 7 The State of Colorado was

indebted to the Ace Flying Service for approximately the amount
claimed by the plaintiff. Aero Spray, Inc. caused a writ of attachment and a garnishee's summons in aid thereof to be served upon
the state comptroller, who acknowledged the indebtedness to the
defendant. Service was had upon the defendant by publication and
mailing of notice of levy. The defendant filed a motion entitled
"Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Return of Service and to
Quash and Dissolve Writ of Attachment and Writ of Garnishment."
The trial court, on the basis of the motion, dismissed the case. The
Supreme Court held that it was error to dismiss the plaintiff's case,
since the relief granted was more than that which was prayed for
by the defendant. It was error to dismiss an action for failure to
obtain proper service, because in the court's view the defects in
service that were complained of could be corrected by proper serv62 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-6-11(1) (1953).
63 341 P.2d at 479.
64 343 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1959).
65 338 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959).
66 138 Colo. 384, 333 P.2d 1040 (1959).
67 338 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1959).
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ice at any time. The court formulated the attachment issues and
found the law to be as follows:
First: Can a foreign corporationplaintiff, not qualified
to do business in Colorado, proceed in attachment and garnishment in this state and thereby subject personal property, in the form of a chose in action due from a resident to
defendant, to payment of a debt which has a foreign origin
and which is owing by the foreign corporate defendant to
the said plaintiff?
This question is answered in the .affirmative. Rule 102
(a) R.C.P. Colo. provides in pertinent part:
"The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons or
filing the complaint in an action on contract, express or implied, * * * may have the property of the defendant, not
exempt from execution, attached as security for any judgment that may be recovered in such action, in the manner
prescribed in this rule, * * *."

One of the grounds upon which the writ of attachment may
issue is, 'That the defendant is a foreign corporation.' At
no place in the various subsections of the rule governing
attachment procedures is there any provision which excludes foreign corporations from the right to make use of
the remedies of attachment and garnishment. The rule itself provides the answer .... 68
RULE 105

Rule 105 came into play in Clopine v. Kemper,6 9 which was
ancillary to the divorce action of Kemper v. Kemper. 0
The Clopines brought an action under rule 105 to obtain an adjudication of the rights of all parties with respect to certain real
estate which they had acquired from Hazel Kemper. Arthur Kemper filed a lis pendens and a homestead entry on property located
in Sedgwick County, Colorado, before he filed his complaint in divorce in the Denver district court. The trial court struck the homestead entry, because the defendant had never resided on the real
estate, but upheld the lis pendens, and both rulings were approved
by the Supreme Court. The principal case held that the Clopines
were chargeable with notice of the Denver divorce action and that
68 Id. at 277; see Dyonisio v. McWilliams, 338 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1959).
69 344 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1959).
70 344 P.2d 449 (Colo. 1959).
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any rights which they acquired were inferior and subject to Arthur
Kemper's prior claim. In recognizing the early filing of the lis pendens, Mr. Justice Moore said:
It is Hornbook law that the commencement of an action dates from the issuance of the summons and not the
date of filing the complaint. As above noted, this action
was commenced by the issuance of a summons on July 2,
1954, and whether notice of lis pendens began running July
3rd or July 6th is immaterial, for plaintiffs purchased the
property more than two years
after the action was started
71
and the lis pendens was filed.
Mr. Justice Moore's statement as to the commencement of an
action would appear to be contrary to the clear wording of rule 3
(a) and (b), which cause an action to be commenced and jurisdiction to attach only after the time of filing of the complaint or the
service of summons.
The Supreme Court also cast aside the Clopines' contentions
that the lis pendens was invalid because the property upon which
it was imposed was not described in the Denver divorce complaint
and held that only the notice must contain a description of the
property.
Broadway Roofing & Supply, Inc. v. District Court72 was filed
in the Supreme Court as an original proceeding. A rule was directed to the respondents to show cause why they should not be
restrained from enforcing an order entered by the district court
which purported to release a lis pendens recorded against real
estate. The petitioner urged that the district court had abused its
discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction. The petitioner, the plaintiff below, had performed labor and supplied material on real property owned by the Nelsons, who later sold to the Camerons. The
petitioner filed its contract and claimed a lien and brought suit to
foreclose the lien, naming both the Camerons and the Nelsons as defendants. The Camerons moved for summary judgment, and summary judgment was granted and the lis pendens purportedly released.
The Supreme Court found that there was but one claim for relief, and held that under rule 54(b) a final judgment could not be
entered until the claims against all of the parties were finally determined by judgment. It was also held that even if a final judgment could be entered in favor of one defendant, it could only be
entered upon an express determination that there was no just reason for delay. The court therefore held that no final judgment had
been made. Since rule 105 (f) states that a "lis pendens . .. shall

remain in effect for thirty days from the time of entry of final judgment in the trial court" (emphasis added), the lis pendens had not
been released. Accordingly, the rule was discharged by the court.
Cawley v. Cawley' " was a divorce action in which the principal
issue was property settlement. After the entry of the final decree,
the wife filed a petition for property settlement and a lis pendens.
At the hearing on the property settlement the husband offered a
contract for the division of property that had been entered into by
71 Id. at 454.
72 342 P.2d 1022 (Colo. 1959).
73 340 P.2d 122 (Colo. 1959).
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the parties prior to the commencement of the divorce action. The
trial court denied the petition for property settlement and ordered
the lis pendens released. The question of property settlement had
not been reserved for future consideration in the interlocutory or
final decrees of divorce, and the court, therefore, held that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to make a property settlement and that
the wife's rights must rest on her contract.
RULE 106
The remedial writs, whether relief was granted under rule 106,
rule 116, or under article VI, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution, will be reviewed under this rule, except where the writs involved specific procedural questions which have been the subject
of review in earlier parts of this article.
Lucas v. District Court 74 has been quoted more as authority for
a broad interpretation of rule 26 (b) than for a delineation of procedure in the Supreme Court on original proceedings. However,
Lucas sounded the death knell to original proceedings under rule
106. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is recognized by
rule 116, as well as the Colorado Constitution, and the following
cases recognize original jurisdiction, or the court's interpretation of
the remedial writs.
The court held in the Lucas case, which was an original proceeding under rule 106 in the nature of mandamus, that rule 106
does not apply to original proceedings, and said:
The Constitution of Colorado, Article VI, Section 3, declares in referring to this Court that 'It shall have power to

issue writs of * * * mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari,

injunction, and other original and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine the same. * * *'
In Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781,
we said:
Our authority to entertain remedial writs is conferred
by the Constitution, and 'is not dependent upon, or governed by the statute' or rules of civil procedure on the subject

....

'Those writs, however, are the common law writs

We shall treat this complaint as if it were a petition
seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari
as the same existed at common law ....

75

The court's ruling on the original proceedings in the Lucas case
was the subject of a blistering dissent by Mr. Justice Hall, 76 after a
rehearing was held by the Supreme Court, in which he said on the
procedural question:
The majority opinion, contrary to the expressed understanding of all counsel in the matter, states that this is not
a proceeding under Rule 106 for the reason that:
"This rule does not apply to original proceedings."
Such statement runs contrary to dozens of decisions of this
court wherein original proceedings brought in district
74 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959).
75 Id. at 1066.
76 Id. at 1075 (dissenting opinion).
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courts and this court pursuant to77 this rule have been recognized, sanctioned and approved.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall, rule 106 precludes the granting of the relief that was requested in the Lucas case, because of
the wording of rule 106, which states, "Review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion."
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall, in an original proceeding in
prohibition, mandamus and certiorari, the court may only determine questions of jurisdiction and must scrupulously avoid determination of the merits. Mr. Chief Justice Knauss and Mr. Justice
Sutton joined him in his view.
The proceedings which occurred in 1959 involving prohibition,
mandamus, habeas corpus, and quo warranto (and whether they
were before the Supreme Court as original proceedings or by writ
of error) will be set out under separate headings under this rule.
Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus came into play under rule 106 and
under article VI, section 3 of the constitution in the year 1959, but
no petitioner saw fit to utilize the provisions of the Colorado
habeas
79
78
corpus statute, which is ambiguous, to say the least.

In Lowe v. People, 0 the petitioner sought a release by habeas
corpus after he was returned to Colorado in an extradition proceeding. He pleaded guilty in the district court and was sentenced
to the penitentiary. Thereafter, he claimed that he was illegally
extradited and that his plea of guilty was extracted by coercion, intimidation, and threats and that the trial court acted irregularly
and contrary to law in disposing of the habeas corpus proceedings.
The petitioner appeared pro se, and the court again repeated that
there must be a substantial compliance with the requirements by
even a layman who assumes the burden of representing himself.
The court said:
Habeas corpus may be invoked to question the Court's
jurisdiction of the person or its jurisdiction of the accusation made against him or where the question arises as to
whether the judgment and sentence were within the prescribed statutory limits. A writ of habeas corpus, however,
is not a corrective remedy, and it is never allowed to perform the function of a writ of error.81
The court said that jurisdiction is not impaired by the manner
in which the accused is brought before it, and, therefore, no jurisdictional problem existed. The Supreme Court pointed out that a
writ of error and not a writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy
to secure relief, if the facts were as the petitioner charged.
Gallegos v. Tinsley 2 was a joint petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed in the District Court of Fremont County by two of the
defendants who had been convicted of rape in the District Court of
Pueblo County and sentenced to the state penitentiary. They were
77 Id. at 1077 (dissenting opinion).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 65-1-3 (1953).
79 See Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959);
Comment, Habeas Corpus in Colorado for the Convicted Criminal, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 145 (1958).
80 343 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1959).
81 Id. at 633.
82 337 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1959).
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both fifteen years of age. They claimed that the statute8 3 required
that they be sentenced to the state reformatory and not to the penitentiary and that the sentence imposed was void. In sustaining the
trial court, the Supreme Court held that he District Court of Fremont County had equal and coordinate jurisdiction with the District
Court of Pueblo County, and that the District Court of Pueblo
County had jurisdiction of the crime and of the person, and had
the power to pronounce sentence. The court stated again that a
district court, in a collateral proceeding, had no jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the judgment of a court of equal jurisdiction.
Marshall v. Geer8 4 stated the Supreme Court's views on the
reconsideration of a writ of habeas corpus on the same questions
which were reviewed by the Supreme Court on a previous occasion.
The court refused to review a successive application based on the
same grounds as those that were reviewed by it before. The court
held that res judicata applies to habeas corpus proceedings and affirmed the trial court's decision discharging the writ.
Mendez v. Tinsley s3 came about after Mendez was tried and
convicted on an information charging robbery and conspiracy to
commit robbery and erroneously sentenced to the penitentiary for
assault to commit robbery. Mendez was nineteen years old and petitioned for habeas corpus, alleging that he could not be sentenced
to the penitentiary for the crime upon which sentence was pronounced and upon which mittimus issued. The trial court denied
the petition for habeas corpus and set aside the robbery count of
the information, resentenced the defendant for robbery to the penitentiary, and then caused a mittimus to issue on the newly imposed
sentence. In reviewing the trial court's action, the court again said
that the sole question in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether the
court went beyond or exceeded its jurisdiction, and said that the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be substituted for review by writ of
error. The court held that since the information upon which sentence was pronounced was quashed by the trial court, there was
nothing upon which the mittimus or warrant of commitment could
stand, and the judgment of conviction became void, requiring that
the prisoner be discharged.
Quo Warranto
In an original proceeding in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the court examined the procedure for creating a water con86
servancy district. People v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist.
The Supreme Court reviewed the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, found that the decree creating the district was a nullity,
and made the ruling to show cause absolute. When the court again
reviewed. the case on a petition for rehearing it found that the petition for'rehearing was not in compliance with rule 118 and could be
stricken because it contained argument and contained no citation of
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. J 39-10-1 (1953).
84 344 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1959).
85 336 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1959).
86 343 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1959).
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authority or reference to the record and briefs in relation to matters
that the court had allegedly overlooked or misapprehended. However, because of the importance of the issues involved, the court did
not strike the petition for rehearing, and again reviewed the matter.
The court ruled that there was no provision for review of the trial
court's proceeding by writ of error and that quo warranto was the
only procedure which afforded adequate relief. The court, therefore, searched the entire record and did not limit the issue to fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, or invalidity on the face of the decree. The
court adhered to its original finding that the statutes for the formation of a water conservancy district had not been complied with.
Prohibition
87
the
In City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hagodol
court reviewed its earlier pronouncements in Beth Medrosh Hagodol
v. City of Aurora.88 On remand from the earlier case, the trial court
upheld a plea of res judicata, which was raised when Aurora again
sought to condemn a right-of-way through an allegedly public cemetery owned by Beth Medrosh Hagodol. When the Supreme Court
first examined the rights of the litigants, the court had before it an
original proceeding in the nature of prohibition, and in that instance
the court made the rule absolute, with the same parties and the
same condemnation issues before it. The court reviewed its earlier
pronouncement and said that a writ of prohibition is preventive in
that it restrains excessive or an improper assumption of jurisdiction
by a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers, and that
the sole inquiry is whether the inferior judicial tribunal is exercising a jurisdiction which it does not possess, or, having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties, has exceeded its legitimate
powers. The court carefully pointed out that questions of jurisdiction do not encompass consideration of the merits of the cause. The
court found that the allegation regarding the dedication of the property in question as a cemetery was disputed in the earlier case and
that that issue required the presentation of evidence. No evidence
was taken on the issue of dedication of the cemetery to a public use
in the trial court, and the court held that the trial court's finding
therefore prejudiced the City of Aurora. The case was remanded
to the trial court to take evidence on all issues.
Certiorari
In Marker v. City of Colorado Sprinqs,1) the plaintiffs endeavored to review the action of the City of Colorado Springs in granting a use variance permit to erect a medical office building on property zoned as R-3 and located directly across from the GlocknerPenrose Hospital. The court, in affirming the judgment of the trial
court, held that in a certiorari proceeding the scope of review is
limited, and that the authority of the courts to interfere with the
findings of tribunals vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine
particular issues, depends solely upon whether there is any competent evidence to support the findings that were made. The record
contained ample evidence to sustain the findings of the bodies vest87 345 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1959).
88 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
89 138 Colo. 485, 336 P.2d 305 (1959).
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ed under the ordinance with authority to determine the zoning issues and nothing appeared in the record to indicate that the proceedings or the conclusions reached were arbitrarily or capriciously
arrived at, and the trial court was, therefore, affirmed.90
City and County of Denver v. District Court,91 in an original
proceeding in the nature of certiorari, challenged an order of the
district court awarding the Glendale Water and Sanitation District,
in an eminent domain proceeding, immediate possession of Cherry
Creek. The purpose of the condemnation was to enable the sanitation district to discharge sewage into Cherry Creek, which was admittedly a dry bed throughout the greater part of the year. The
court found this to be comparable to discharging sewage into gutters, streets, and barrow pits. In holding that public waters or beds
or channels of public streams could not be condemned for sewage
purposes, the court made the rule to show cause absolute.
RULE 116
A Public Utilities Commission ruling, granting lower rates to
railroads than to truckers on intrastate hauls, was considered by the
Supreme Court as an original proceeding under rule 116, in Groendyke Transport Co. v. District Court.92 The court, however, would
not allow the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under rule 116
to be invoked to question the trial court's order allowing intervention under rule 24. The court held that a party seeking to invoke
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must be able to show
prima facie, at least, circumstances justifying the exercise of such
jurisdiction and that rule 116 may not be utilized to avoid the requirement of a final judgment.
The issue before the court was "[W] hether an order granting
intervention is of such character and finality as to presumptively
deny to other parties to the action any rights which could not be
adequately reviewed ... by writ of error. ' 93 It was the court's opinion that orders relating to intervention are interlocutory and that
the issue framed by the court required a negative answer.
In People v. Hively,' 4 an original proceeding, the Attorney General of Colorado caused a citation to be issued to the Assessor of
Arapahoe County to show cause why he should not be adjudged in
contempt of court for his failure to comply with the orders of the
Supreme Court in a former original proceeding in mandamus and
prohibition that bore the same name.
In the first proceeding 9 , an order was obtained compelling the
assessor to comply with the directions of the State Board of Equalization, which fixed the valuation of real and personal property in
Arapahoe County, and prohibited the District Court of Arapahoe
County from proceeding further in an action by the assessor and
the residents of Arapahoe County to set aside the orders and directions of the Board of Equalization.
90 Accord, Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 342 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959) (also
held that certiorari is proper remedy when public commission exceeds jurisdiction or abuses discretion);

Civil Service Comm'n v. Conklin, 138 Colo. 528, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
91 342 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1959).
92 343 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1959).
93 Id. at 537.
94 344 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1959).

95 People ex rel.State Board of Equalization v. Hively, 336 ?.2d 721 (Colo. 1959).
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The assessor, in defense of the contempt citation, urged that the
court lacked jurisdiction, that the Attorney General had not complied with the requirements of rule 25 (d) in substituting the assessor for his predecessor, had not shown that he, as assessor, had continued or threatened to continue the actions of his predecessor, and
that he had not had adequate notice. He also urged that he acted
on the advice of counsel. The Supreme Court cut through the defenses and adjudged the assessor to be in contempt.
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